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ABSTRACT
We present the first nation wide value of life estimates for the United States at more than one
point in time. Our estimates are for every ten years between 1940 and 1980, a period when declines
in fatal accident rates were historically unprecedented. Our estimated elasticity of value of life with
respect to per capita GNP is 1.5 to 1.7. We illustrate the importance of rising value of life for policy
evaluation by examining the benefits of improved longevity since 1900, showing that the current
marginal increase in longevity is more valuable than the large increase in the first half of the
twentieth century.
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declined by 0.08 per million hours worked, with roughly90 percent of the decline occurringprior
to 1960. By historical standards this decline was unprecedented. Fishback (1992: 103) reports
that in coal mining fatality rates were constant between 1904 and 1930. The 1930s experienced
a slight downward trend in fatality rates in the mineral industries, but nothing as pronounced as
the 1940-1980 decline that we document (Minerals Yearbook). Although railroad fatality rates
fell during the 1910s and 1920s, they were roughly constant between 1894 and 1911 and during
the 1930s and 1940s (Fishback and Kim 1993). But, even though the largest changes in fatality
rates occurred in the ﬁrst two decades after World War II, most researchers measuring the value
of life have generally focused on the 1970s onwards (see Viscusi (1993) for a review).
This paper presents the ﬁrst nationwide value of life estimates for the United States at
more than one point in time. We estimate value of life in 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980
using census micro-data and BLS fatalitydata by industry to recover the trend in the value of life.
These years provide us with consistent data series and, more importantly, shed light on a little
studied but important period for job safety.
Our hedonic regressions estimated at ﬁve points in time yield information on how
compensation for job risk has changed as job safety has risen. We document that as the quantity
of safety has increased over time, the compensating differentialhas also increased. This is strong
evidence that the demand for safety has increased.
Repeat hedonic regressions are also useful for establishing the incidence of safety
improvements over time. We document which socioeconomic and demographic groups have had
the greatest reductionin risk exposure over time and we decompose reductions in average job risk
into composition effects versus within industry risk progress.
1Our ﬁndings have implications for the use of value of life estimates by government
agencies for prospective policy evaluation and by academics for retrospective policy evaluation.
Arisingvalueoflifesuggests thatmarginalimprovementsinsafety andinlongevityare becoming
more valuable. Most analysts and researchers, however, use value of life estimates derived from
1970s and 1980s data on compensating wage differentials for job risk, commonly measuring
the value of life as between 3 to 6 million 1990 dollars. Government agencies, such as the
EnvironmentalProtectionAgency in assessing the costs and beneﬁts of radon indrinkingwater or
of particulates in air, treat the value of life as a constant, adjusting only for inﬂation. Researchers
who have estimated the beneﬁts of increased longevity and health over several decades or even
over awhole centuryhave also treatedthe valueoflifeas aconstant (e.g. Nordhaus2002; Murphy
and Topel 2002; Cutler and Richardson 1997).
2 Empirical Framework
There is no reason to think hat willingness to pay for risk reduction has remained constant when
incomes have risen and the risk of death from other causes has fallen. On theoretical grounds we
would expect that the value of life has increased because incomes have increased. Rosen’s (1988)
model shows that the value of life can be expressed as the marginal rate of substitution between
wealth and the probability of survival. Unless people pay to increase risk, as wealth increases so
does the value of life. For a working person, as the wage increases so does the value of life.
The value of life will also increase with improvements in elderly health, longevity, and
well-being.1 Suppose that individuals live for two periods, workingwhen young and then, if they
1Dow, Philipson, and Sala-i-Martin (1999) show that a decline in the probabilityof death from other causes will
increase value of life.




























probability of dying from disease, and
V is discounted utility from retirement. In the United
States the one year mortality rate at age 65 fell from 0.04 in 1900 to 0.03 in 1940 and then to
0.02 in 1980. As





￿, will increase as the young value living more. If
V increases because elderly health improves or because retirement becomes more enjoyable (as
Costa (1998) suggests has happened historically) then the risk premium increases. A low risk job
guarantees individuals their “old” utility. If expected utility when retired is high, individuals will
need more compensation to take a gamble when young.
We estimate value of life from measured labor market compensating differentials for
risk taking using the 1940-1980 censuses and fatality data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(see the Data Appendix for details). For every year,











































where j indexes the individual, w is the hourly wage, f is the industry fatality risk, u is the error
term, and the vector X consists of age dummies indicating race, foreign birth, marital status,
education, blue collar status, and residence in a metropolitan area, and state ﬁxed effects. We
restrict the sample to full-time male workers age 18 to 45 because the young are more likely to
be in the riskier jobs within an industry. We restrict to men because we do not have fatality rates
for women by industry. We excluded workers in agriculture, telecommunications, transportation,
3and utilities and do not analyze data for 1990 or later because of non-comparabilityacross years.2
The wage is trimmed in each decade by dropping the bottom and top one percent of wages. Our
state ﬁxed effects will capture the effects of such variablees as state workers’ compensation rates.
Unlike previous studies, we cluster our standard errors by the 3 digit 1950 industry classiﬁcation,
because we are adjusting the standard errors for unobserved industry attributes (Moulton 1990).
We do not control for injury rates because the data are not comparable over the years that we
examine.
Figure 1 shows that in each decade and for every broad industry category job safety has
been rising. Differences in job fatality risk between mining, construction, manufacturing, and
other industries (mainly trade) narrowed since 1940, with most of the decline occurring before
1970. In 1940 fatality rates in the two most dangerous industries, mining and construction were 6
and 10 times, respectively, greater than those in manufacturing. By 1980 fatality rates in mining
and construction were only 2 and 3 times, respectively, as high as those in manufacturing.
Estimating the hedonic wage regression at ﬁve points in time yields ﬁve estimates of the
marginal valuation of risk. A hedonic identiﬁcation issue arises as to how to interpret changes in
these compensating differentialsover time. Given that job safety is risingover time, if we observe
that compensating differentialsare rising then this is evidence that the demand for job safety must
be rising. If workers experienced diminishing returns from job safety then safety improvements
could have led to declining compensating differentials over time.
Ourcross-sectional hedonicwageregressions willrecoverthevalue oflifeprovidedthat
labor markets are perfectly competitive, that observables control for differences in productivity,
and that all workers have the same preferences over money and risk and are informed about
actuarial risk probabilities. A recent literature has examined how relaxing these conditions
2As discussed in the Data Appendix, the BLS changed its survey methodology in 1992 and no longer provide
comparable data by industry for 1990.
4affects the interpretation of hedonic wage regression estimates. Within each year several factors
will lead us to underestimate the true value of life. Because we observe those with the lowest
value of life in risky jobs, we will underestimate willingness to pay for safety. If workers are
heterogeneous in their abilities and if the econometrician can only partially observe workers’
skills, then we will underestimate the value of life in any given year. According to Hwang, Reed,
and Hubbard’s (1992) derivation, in the limit the ratio of the estimated fatal injury coefﬁcient, ˆ
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  is the average share of renumeration taken in the form of wages instead of beneﬁts
or ameneties,
  is the proportion of wage dispersion due to workers’ differing tastes, and
 
is the degree of unobserved productivity heterogeneity which is equal to zero when workers’
productivity is perfectly observed. In this case the bias is equal to zero. When
















￿,then the estimated coefﬁcient on fatalityrates will have an incorrect
positive sign. If all renumeration were taken in the form of wages then the bias would be zero. It
would also be zero if all of wage dispersion were due to workers’ differing tastes, rather than to
their productivity.
Otherfactorswillbias ourestimates ofthe valueof lifeupwards. Shogrenand Stamland
(2002) argue that once one accounts for both risk preference and the personal ability to reduce
risk or death or injury, then value of life estimates are biased upwards even if workers self-select
their jobs on the basis of their value of life and their skill. A second reason why our estimates
of value of life may be biased upwards in each year is because the BLS data over-sample large
ﬁrms and therefore underestimate risk. In addition, because we cannot control for injury rates,
this biases our estimates of the value of life upwards.
5We view our trend as yielding a lower bound estimate of changes in the value of life.
According to the Hwang, Reed, and Hubbard (1992) bias formula (Equation 4), the downward
bias will be greater in 1980 than in 1940 even if there were no change in workers’ unobserved
productivity because beneﬁts have become a bigger share of renumeration. We suspect that the
proportion of wage dispersion due to tastes has always been low. The degree of unobserved
workerproductivitywas probably high in both 1940 and 1980, but it is most likely to be higher in
recent data, so again the bias in 1940 will be lower than in 1980. Under Shogren and Stamland’s
(2002) conditions, our estimate of the trend in the value of life will be a lower bound if in the
past the marginal worker was more likely to be low skilled in reducing his personal fatality
rate, perhaps because knowledge was less likely to diffuse to marginal workers.3 If the omitted
variables bias from excluding injury rates was greater in 1940 then in 1980 because injury rates
were higher in 1940, then we will underestimate the increase in the value of life. Because jobs
have become safer, then if workerutility is concave with respect to safety, our linear speciﬁcation
will yield a declining estimate of the value of life. If the proportion of risk lovers is constant over
time in the working population, then given that the share of jobs in risky occupations has shrunk,
the marginal worker would require a lower risk premium. Therefore these factors will impart a
downward bias to our estimate of trends in the value of life.
3 Trends
Averageriskcanfalleitherbecause ofcompositionshiftsofworkersintolessdangerousindustries
orbecause ofwithinindustryriskdeclines. Table 1showsthat declinesinindustryspeciﬁcfatality
3Our estimate of the trend in value of life will be an upper bound if today the marginal worker is more likely to
be relatively low skilled in coping with job risk, a plausible scenario only if the high skill workers have been able to
process increases in knowledge.
6risk, not the shift of workers into less dangerous industries are the main cause for the decline in
overall job risk. Eighty-two to 100 percent of the decline in deaths per million hours worked is
due to within industry declines, with declines in construction and in manufacturing accounting
for the majority of the change. Given that rising globalization has permitted the export of the
more dangerous jobs abroad, it is striking that declining fatality rates within industry and not the
shift of workers out of industries has lowered overall fatality rates.
Several factors probably accounted for the decline in fatality rates. These include
exogeneous upgrading of the capital stock, ﬁrms’ proﬁt maximizing response to compensating
differentials, union emphasis on job safety and high unionization rates in the 1940s and 1950s,
increases in state workmens’ compensation payments in the 1940s and 1950s, workers’ greater
safety precautions as ﬁrms moved away from piece rates, and government regulation. Until 1960
regulation was primarilyon the state level, although the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 created
the Division of Labor Standards to help state governments improve their job safety laws and their
administration. In 1960 the Labor Department imposed federal standards on the states using
its powers under the Walsh-Healey Act of 1936 to bar employment under hazardous conditions.
Federal oversight increased with the 1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). Using
longitudinal ﬁrm data, Gray and Jones (1991) report that OSHA health inspections increased
compliance with safety legislation. We are not aware of any studies that investigate the impact of
earlier legislation.
How have the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of who works in risky
industries changed? Average risk exposure between men and women narrowed (see Figure 2). In
1940 men’s average risk exposure was almost 4 times greater than that of women and in 1980 it
was twice as high. Because we do not have industry fatality data by sex, this trend represents a
composition shift.
Table 2 illustrates changes in risk incidence with results from regressions for men in
7each decade,




















u is an error term. Controlling for broad industry group (mining, construction,
manufacturing, trade, and other), risk exposure by race, education, and age has become much
more equal over time. The difference in fatality rates faced by non-whites and whites controlling
for other characteristics was 0.041 in 1940 and zero in 1980. The difference in fatality rates faced
by those with less than a high school education compared to those with a high school education
was 0.014 in 1940 and 0.003 in 1980. Differences in fatality rates between those with less than
a high school education and the college educated are similar. Each year of age added roughly
0.004 to the fatality rate in 1940 but nothing thereafter. Interestingly, the foreign-born were not
exposed to more risk.
4 Results
4.1 Hedonic Regressions
Figure 3 presents non-parametric regressions illustrating that the wage (adjusted for mean state
wage) increased with industry risk in both 1940 and 1980 among men with some high school
education.4 The continuous increase in wages as fatality rates rise implies that our results do not
4We adjusted the wage by subtracting mean wage within the state from workers’ wages. Our non-parametric
regressions use a Gaussian kernel and Nadaraya-Watson kernel smoother with a bandwith of 0.4 (H¨ ardle 1991: 25,
147-89).
8depend upon one or two high risk and high wage industries and that our identiﬁcation does not
come from extreme risk. This ﬁgure also shows that in 1980 the relationship between wage and
risk was steeper than in 1940, suggesting that risk compensation has increased over time. To
control for other characteristics that may affect the wage-risk relationship we turn to the ordinary
least squares regressions speciﬁed in Equations 2 and 3.
Tables 3 and 4 present results from our linear and log-linear hedonic regressions,
respectively, controlling for race, foreign-birth, marital status, education, blue collar status,
residence in a metropolitan area, and state ﬁxed effects. In both cases we stratify by ages 18-30
and 31-45. We believe that the risk premium will be more pronounced for younger workers to
entice them to enter dangerous jobs. We present results for all educational levels and also for
some high school or high school graduates, groups that are likely to be exposed to job risk within
an industry.
Our linear wage speciﬁcation shows a clear secular increase in the job risk premium.
For those with some high school or high school graduates, the coefﬁcient on the fatality rate is
signiﬁcantly different from zero in all years except for 1960 in both the linear and the log-linear
speciﬁcations. Although we lose signiﬁcance in other stratiﬁcations of the data, particularly in
1970, the magnitude of the coefﬁcients suggests an upward trend. (Because, unlike previous
researchers, we are clustering our standard errors by industry, we are reducing the statistical
signiﬁcanceofourfatalityratecoefﬁcients. Moulton(1990)showsthatt-statisticsfalldramatically
with clustering.) We also ﬁnd that compensation for job risk is generally greater for our younger
workers.5 A behavioral explanation would be that workersneed to be offered a large initial salary
to enter the ﬁeld, but then have ﬂat experience proﬁleson the job as they become inured to danger.
We ran several robustness checks in which we examined other sample restrictions
5As noted above, this may reﬂect measurement error.
9and additional controls. When we restricted to the college-educated, a group unlikely to be
in dangerous jobs even controllling for industry, none of our coefﬁcients on injury rates were
statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero, as expected. We pooled the data and included
state and industry ﬁxed effects. This yielded coefﬁcients of similar magnitude, but only the
coefﬁcients on the year dummies for 1950 and 1980 were statistically signiﬁcantly different
from the coefﬁcient on the year 1940 dummy. We ran our regressions without miners, a group
that Figure 1 showed experienced the most dramatic declines in injury rates. For high school
or high school graduates age 18-30, this left the 1940 coefﬁcient virtually unchanged, the 1950
coefﬁcientsmallerandnolongerstatisticallysigniﬁcant, the1960and1970coefﬁcientslargerand
the latter statistically signiﬁcant, and the 1980 coefﬁcient smaller but still statistically signiﬁcant.
We ran our speciﬁcations controlling for such industry characteristics as average age, percent
high school, some college, and college-educated, percent female, percent non-white, and percent
foreign-born. The magnitude of our coefﬁcients was smaller and signiﬁcance fell, but the trend
was still there. We investigated using industry pollution (as proxied by energy intensity) as a
control for job amenities. Our coefﬁcient on energy intensity was not statistically signiﬁcant
and our other coefﬁcients were unaffected. We also directly controlled for expected workers
compensation beneﬁts based upon individual earnings and state formulas and for state union
rates, but this yielded very similar results to those presented in our tables because our state ﬁxed
effects controlled for these differences.
We investigated using wife’s earnings as an instrument for the fatality risk faced by
married men because men whose families have greater earnings capacity are likely to choose
safer jobs (Garen 1988). Our instrument was only weakly correlated with industry fatality rates
and the coefﬁcients on our instrumented fatality rate were many orders of magnitude larger than
those on our uninstrumented fatality rate.
We recognize that discrete choice methods such as those presented in Berry, Levinsohn,
10and Pakes (1995) could be used be used to more directly estimate whether marginal valuations
for safety have increased over time. A discrete choice demand study would face at least two
challenges. Because there are 48 states and over 100 industries, the dimensionality of this
problem would be cumbersome. In addition, as documented in industrial organization studies
such as Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Petrin (2002), a discrete choice model of risky
industry choice would face the extra challenge of instrumenting for wages. The industry wage
would be an explanatory variable in a discrete choice model. It is likely to be correlated with
observed industry attributes embedded in the error term. In a hedonic model, industry wage is a
dependent variable and ordinary least squares will yield consistent implicit price estimates if the
industry risk level is uncorrelated with the error term.
4.2 Value of Life
Table 5shows thatvalueoflifehas increased by300to400percentbetween 1940and1980, rising
from roughly 1 million 1990 dollars in 1940 to 4 to 5 million 1990 dollars in 1980.6 Using our
value of life estimates for workers with some high school and regressing the logarithm of value
of life on the logarithmof per capita GNP we found that the elasticity of value of life with respect
to per capita GNP was 1.5 using the log-linear speciﬁcation and 1.7 using the linear speciﬁcation.
How do our estimates of value of life compare with those of other researchers? Table 6
lists results from other studies in 1990 dollars. Our estimates for 1970 of 3 to 5 million 1990
dollars are on the low end of Viscusi’s (1978) estimates of 3 to 8 million dollars for 1969-1970.
Our estimates for 1980 of 4 to 5 million dollars are within the range of 3 to 6 million found by
Viscusi (1993) for data from the 1980s. Our 1940 estimate of 1 million 1990 dollars is similar to
6For our linear speciﬁcation, value of life is
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  is the coefﬁcient on fatalityrisk and
w is the hourlywage.
11that observed in Taiwan in 1987 and to Hong Kong in 1991 (Hammittet al. 2000; Siebertand Wei
1998). Our elasticity of value of life with respect to per capita GNP of 1.5 to 1.7 is on the low
end of the range of 1.5 to 2.5 found by Hammitt et al. (2000) for Taiwan. Using our elasticity of
per capita GNP with respect to per capita GNP of either 1.5 or 1.7 we estimate that the value of
life in 1900 was 0.3 million dollars and in 1920 was 0.6 million dollars. Our estimated value of
life in 1900 is therefore greater than that found by Fishback and Kim (1993) within railroads in
the United States circa 1900 and our estimated value of life in 1920 is within Fishback’s (1992)
estimate of 0.2 to 0.8 million for coal mining in the United States in the 1910s and 1920s. We
predictthat in2000 thevalue oflifewas 6.1 to 8.7 million1990dollars or8.5 to 12.1 2002dollars.
5 Implications for Mortality Declines
One of the implications of rising value of life is that evaluations of the beneﬁts of mortality
reductions or health improvements over the entire twentieth century underestimate the value of
current improvements in health or mortality relative to the dramatic improvements of the past.
Table 7 illustrates. The largest age-adjusted mortalitydeclines occurredpriorto 1960 when infant
mortality fell sharply. In 1900 the probability of a child dying before age 1 was 0.15 and his
life expectancy at birth was 48. By 1960 the probability of death before age 1 was 0.03 and life
expectancy at birth was 70. Applying our estimated values of life for 1980 to all years, we would
conclude that the biggest gains were indeed prior to 1960 when the biggest change in quantities
occurred. If we assumed that the income elasticity of value of life was equal to one and used the
ratioof 1980value oflife to1980 GNP tocalculate values of life, then we wouldconcludethat the
valueofmortalitydeclines waslowerbetween1980and2000thanbetween1940and1960. Using
our calculated and predicted value of life estimates from our speciﬁcations demonstrates that the
largest gains occurred after 1960 when mortality gains were relatively marginal and that gains
12between 1980 and 2000 were substantial.7 After 1960, the largest increases in life expectancy
came in older age mortality. Life expectancy at age 65 increased by 3 years over the 60 years
between 1900 and 1960, but by another 3 years over the shorter time span between 1960 and
2000. Under the constant, income elasicity of one, and income elasticity greater than one value
of life scenarios, per capita national health care expenditures are increasing faster than the value
of mortality declines, but when we do not allow for actual changes in the value of life, our health
care sector seems much less productive.
6 Conclusion
Studies from the United States past and from developing countries suggest that value of life
increases with economic development, but because these studies are not comparable in either
their sample selection or their speciﬁcations, calculating an income elasticity from these value of
life estimates is problematic. Estimating comparable regressions from 1940 to 1980, this paper
found that value oflife in the United States has indeed been risingand that the estimated elasticity
of value of life with respect to per capita GNP was 1.5 to 1.7. The growing premium that workers
have been receivingforworkingin unsafe jobsand the simultaneous increase injob safetyimplies
that workers are not paying for increases in job safety.
Our ﬁndings on rising value of life have implications for evaluating current health and
safety regulations. For investments where the beneﬁts accrue for several decades, using current
value of life estimates will underestimate the economic gains. This will be particularly true for
developing countries that are growing rapidly.
Our ﬁndings also bear on prospective evaluations of the beneﬁts of mortalityreductions
7For simplicity,we value life at allpointsinthe life-cycle equally. However, we wouldexpect value of lifetoﬁrst
rise and then decrease withage (Rosen 1988),thoughat whatages and at what rate is an unanswered empirical issue.
13or health improvements over the entire twentieth century. Using a constant value of life will
underestimate the value of current improvements in health or mortality relative to the dramatic
improvements of the past. Assuming an income elasticity of value of life that is equal to one
will underestimate the value of the most recent improvements in mortality and paint our health
care sector as less productive than it really is. We showed that accurately allowing for changes in
prices, the largest beneﬁts of improved mortality occur after 1960 and are substantial even during
the last twenty years when mortality gains were relatively marginal compared to those of the ﬁrst
half of the twentieth century.
Data Appendix
We use the 1940-1980 censuses of population and housing.8 We link by 3 digit industry codes to
fatalitydata published bythe Bureau ofLabor Statistics(BLS). We restrictoursample to full-time
male workers age 18 to 45.
1. Industry fatality rates. Fatality rates are per million hours worked. Rates for 1940
are from Industrial-Injury Statistics by States, BLS Bulletin No. 700 and for mining from
Minerals Yearbook, 1941, those for 1950 from Work Injuries in the United States During
1950, BLS Bulletin No. 1098, those for 1960 are from Injury Rates By Industry, 1963, BLS
Report No. 295 (earlier years do not report fatality rates), for 1970 from Injury Rates By
Industry, 1970, BLS Report No. 406, and for 1980 from Appendix E in Leigh (1995). The
dataprovidedbyLeigh (1995)arefromunpublishedBLS tabulations. They areper100,000
workers. All rates were converted to million hours worked using data from Hours, Wages,
and Earnings in the United States. We were not able to obtain fatality data by industry
8We use the integrated public use micro samples available at http://www.ipums.umn.edu/.
14for 1990 because the BLS no longer provide these data and, although they could be re-
estimated from their records, the cost was prohibitive. In 1992, the BLS changed its survey
methodology, including smaller establishments, workerson small farms, the self-employed
and family workers, and public sector workers. Reported fatality rates rose.
The BLS obtained fatality rates by surveying ﬁrms. Because large ﬁrms are over-sampled
in 1940-1980, accident rates are underestimated. Firms faced ﬁnes for non-reporting only
beginning in 1972. The BLS also reported injury rates. These are for injuries resulting
in permanent partial disability and temporary total disability. After 1971 the deﬁnition of
an injury changed to those established under the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970. This change expanded the deﬁnition of an injury. For details see the
reports cited above and also various issues of Handbook of Labor Statistics.
We do not have fatality information for agricultural workers and we excluded fatality
information for workers in telecommunications, transportation, and utilities. When we
examined the fatality data for workers in telecommunications, transportation, and utilities,
we foundconsiderableswings across decades. We suspect that thiswas due bothto changes
in industry deﬁnitions and to relatively few of these types of ﬁrms reporting. After these
exclusions we were leftwith 163 industries in the census microsamples and we were able to
link 110 of these industries to fatalitydata. We do not limit ourselves to a balanced panel of
industries. Whenwedothemagnitudeofourcoefﬁcientsonfatalityriskremainsunchanged
but the standard errorincreases. The percentage of 18-45 year-old men in manufacturingin
our decade samples ranges from 47 to 55 percent. Our next largest category is “other than
manufacturing, mining, or construction,” ranging from 39 to 26 percent of our sample.
2. Wage. Our hourly wage variable is constructed from annual wage and salary divided by
annual hours worked (current weekly hours multiplied by weeks worked in the past year).
15For 1960 and 1970, where we only have intervalled hours and weeks data, we take the
midpoint. We adjust all wages to 1990 dollars. We multiply the topcode by 1.45. In 1980 a
larger proportion of the population was covered by topcoding than in 1970. However, our
results remain unchanged when we impose a new topcode in 1970. We trim the bottom and
top one percent of wages.
3. Race. Our race variable is a dummy equal to one if the worker was not white.
4. Foreign birth. Our foreign birth variable is a dummy equal to one if the worker was born
abroad.
5. Marital status. Our marital status variable is a dummy equal to one if the worker was
married.
6. Education. We create four dummy variables for education – less than high school, some
high school or high school graduate, some college, and college graduate.
7. Blue collar. Our blue collar variable is a dummy equal to one if the
8. Metropolitan area resident. This is a dummy variable equal to one if the worker lived in a
metropolitan area, as deﬁned by that year’s census. Deﬁnitions vary across years.
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19Table 1: Decompositionof Decline in Deaths per MillionHours into WithinIndustry Decline and
Declines Due to Shifts in Workers Across Industrial Sectors, 1940-1980
Sample Weighted Sample
% ∆ % ∆
∆ due to ∆ due to
Decline in deaths per million hours worked
1940-1980 0.0835 0.0892
Decline due to shifts in workers across
industries -0.0033 -3.8% 0.0158 17.7%
Decline due to within industry risk declines 0.0867 103.8 0.0733 82.3
Decline due to manufacturing 0.0270 32.3 0.0229 25.7
Decline due to mining 0.0159 19.1 0.0135 15.1
Decline due to construction 0.0370 44.3 0.0312 35.0
Decline due to trade 0.0065 7.8 0.0055 6.1
Decline due to other industries 0.0002 0.3 0.0003 0.4
Note: Estimated from the Integrated Public Use Census Samples for both sexes and BLS death rates. The
industries are manufacturing, mining, construction, trade, and other. Other does not include agriculture,
communications, transportation,and utilities. The weighted sample assumes that 3 digit industriesfor which
risk levels are unknownhave the same risk of death as the broad industryaverage. The sample is restricted to
full-time workers age 18 to 45.
20Figure1: DeathsperMillionHoursWorkedbyIndustryAmongWorkersAge18to45, 1940-1980
Source: Estimated from the Integrated Public Use Census Samples and BLS death rates. Other industries do not
include agriculture, communications, transportation, and utilities. The sample is restricted to full-time workers of
both sexes.
21Figure 2: Deaths per Million Hours Worked by Sex Among Workers Age 18 to 45, 1940-1980
Source: Estimated from the Integrated Public Use Census Samples and BLS death rates. Workers in agriculture,
communications, transportation, and utilitiesare excluded. The sample is restricted to full-time workers.
22Table 2: Characteristics of Men in High Risk Industries Controlling for Socio-economic and
Demographic Characteristics and for Industrial Sector, 1940-1980
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Age 0.004
z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
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Age squared 0.000
z 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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(0.010) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Adjusted
R2 0.728 0.649 0.637 0.508 0.685
Number of observations 90,050 10,895 110,225 107,406 176,507
Note: Estimated from the Integrated Public Use Census Samples and BLS death rates. The dependent
variable is the industryfatalityrate per millionhours worked. See Equation5 in the text. Other industrydoes
not include agriculture, communications, transportation, and utilities. The sample is restricted to full-time
workers age 18 to 45. All regressions include state ﬁxed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The
symbols
y and
z indicate that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from 0 at the 5 and 1 percent level,
respectively.
23Figure 3: Non-Parametric Value of Life Regressions
Source: Estimated from the Integrated Public Use Census Samples and BLS death rates. Results are from a kernel
regression with Gaussian kernel and the Nadaraya-Watson kernel smoother with a bandwidth of 0.4 (H¨ ardle 1991:
25, 147-89). The sample is restricted to full-time male workers age 18-45 with some high school education and
excludes workers in agriculture, telecommunications, transportation, and utilities. Mean wage within the state was
substracted from workers’ wages.
24Table 3: Coefﬁcients on Deaths per Million Hours Worked When the Dependent Variable is the
Hourly Wage, 1940-1980





y 1.604 3.301 5.662
z
(0.273) (0.709) (1.277) (2.054) (1.763)
Adjusted
R2 0.275 0.216 0.279 0.264 0.223




y 1.658 3.293 5.033
y
(0.314) (0.628) (1.160) (2.902) (2.214)
Adjusted
R2 0.261 0.199 0.265 0.290 0.216
Observations 45,710 16,213 67,536 58,865 83,205








(0.237) (0.622) (1.377) (2.074) (1.736)
Adjusted
R2 0.233 0.178 0.248 0.218 0.220




  2.132 4.397 5.259
y
(0.388) (0.717) (1.416) (3.804) (2.642)
Adjusted
R2 0.174 0.100 0.132 0.135 0.130
Observations 16,014 7,392 34,705 33,861 42,362
Note: Estimated from the Integrated Public Use Census Samples and BLS death rates using Equation 2. The
reportedcoefﬁcientsareanestimateof
 . Workersinagriculture,communications,transportation,andutilities
are excluded. The sample is restricted to full-time workers age 18 to 45. Coefﬁcients are from an ordinary
least squares regression in which the hourly wage is the dependent variables and additional independent
variables are age and age squared and dummy variables for non-white, foreign-born, married, blue collar,
withina metropolan area, education (less than high school, high school, some college, and college), and state
ﬁxed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The symbols
 ,
y, and
z indicate that the coefﬁcient is
signiﬁcantly different from 0 at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
25Table 4: Coefﬁcients on Deaths per Million Hours Worked When the Dependent Variable is the
Logarithm of the Hourly Wage, 1940-1980




y 0.174 0.121 0.248 0.458
z
(0.077) (0.108) (0.154) (0.155) (0.167)
Adjusted
R2 0.318 0.244 0.302 0.279 0.241
Observations 44,340 12,967 42,689 48,541 93,302
Age 31-45
0.157
y 0.118 0.099 0.193 0.296
 
(0.066) (0.089) (0.106) (0.176) (0.163)
Adjusted
R2 0.290 0.215 0.272 0.271 0.204
Observations 45,710 16,213 67,536 58,865 83,205








(0.064) (0.093) (0.153) (0.153) (0.166)
Adjusted
R2 0.274 0.205 0.275 0.251 0.239
Observations 24,936 7,745 25,561 32,082 55,749
Age 31-45
0.194
z 0.135 0.145 0.254 0.302
 
(0.072) (0.087) (0.116) (0.229) (0.181)
Adjusted
R2 0.197 0.115 0.148 0.145 0.133
Observations 16,014 7,392 34,705 33,861 42,362
Note: Estimated from the Integrated Public Use Census Samples and BLS death rates using Equation 3.
The reported coefﬁcients are an estimate of
 . Workers in agriculture, communications, transportation, and
utilities are excluded. The sample is restricted to full-time workers age 18 to 45. Coefﬁcients are from an
ordinary least squares regression in which the logarithm of the hourly wage is the dependent variables and
additional independent variables are age and age squared and dummy variables for non-white, foreign-born,
married, blue collar, within a metropolan area, education (less than high school, high school, some college,




that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly different from 0 at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
26Table 5: Value of Life Estimates in 1000s of 1990 Dollars, 1940-1980
Some high school or high school
Range of estimates Graduate age 18-30
over all samples Speciﬁcation:
and speciﬁcations Linear Logarithmic
1940 713-996 996 977
1950 1,122-1,755 1,755 1,340
1960 1,085-2,132 2,086 1,658
1970 2,792-4,937 3,744 2,921
1980 4,144-5,347 5,347 4,253
Note: Estimated from Tables 3 and 4. All values are in 1000s of 1990 dollars.
27Table 6: Value of Life Estimates from Previous Literature in 1990 Dollars
Country Year Value of life in
Paper Examined Examined Millions of 1990 US $
Kim and Fishback (1993) USA (railroads) 1893-1909 0.1
Fishback (1992) USA (coal) 1912-1920s 0.2-0.8
Thaler and Rosen (1976) USA 1967 0.2-2.1
Arnould and Nichols (1983) USA 1967 0.8-9.9
Herzog and Schlottman (1990) USA 1965 6.5-8.3
Viscusi (1978) USA 1969-1970 3.0-8.2
Olson (1981) USA 1973 1.5-25.7
Leigh and Folsom (1984) USA 1974-1977 7.9-10.4
Moore and Viscusi (1988) USA 1977 0.2-0.9
Dillingham (1985) USA 1976-1979 0.2-7.1
Leigh (1987) USA 1979-1984 9.6-11.4
Garen (1988) USA 1981-1982 5.8-13.2
Leigh (1995) USA 1980-1985 2.3-12.8
Viscusi (1993) USA 1982-1987 2.6-6.0
Cousineau et al (1992) Canada 1979 1.9-4.3
Martinello and Meng (1992) Canada 1986 6.9-12.0
Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982) UK 1975 2.6-2.9
Siebert and Wei (1994) UK 1983 4.9-11.8
Arabsheibani and Marin (1999) UK 1980-1985 11.2-34.4
Sandy and Elliot (1996) UK 1986 6.8-7.9
Kniesner and Leeth (1991) Australia 1984-85 2.3
Siebert and Wei (1998) Hong Kong 1991 1.4
Kim and Fishback (1999) Korea 1984-1990 0.6




Simon et al. (1999) India c. 1990 0.2-0.4
Note: Non-USvalues of lifewere converted to US dollarsat exchange rates given by the authorsor at current
exchange rates.
28Table 7: The Value of Mortality Declines by Period in 1000s of 1990 Dollars, 1900-2000
1900-20 1920-40 1940-60 1960-80 1980-2000
Age-adjusted mortality
decline per year per million
persons 3,709 3,621 4,458 3,001 1,671
Value of annual mortality
declines, per person:
Using 1980 value of life
of 5.3 million 19,832 19,361 23,837 16,046 8,935
of 4.3 million 15,774 15,400 18,960 12,763 7,106
Using income elasticity of
one and 1980 value of life:
of 5.3 million 4,792 6,420 10,753 13,195 10,721
of 4.3 million 3,765 5,044 9,491 10,446 8,476
Using average value of
in each period:
Column 3, Table 5
and predicted 1,771 2,970 6,860 11,136 11,732
Column 4, Table 5
and predicted 1,719 2,873 5,865 8,854 8,702
Increase in annual per
capita national health
care expenditures 102 369 1,045 1,824
Sources: Age-adjusted death rates are standardized using year 2000 standard populationand are from series
Hist 293, CDC/NCHS. Value of life estimates based upon an income elasticity of one calculate value of life
using the ratio of 1980 value of life to 1980 GNP. Value of life estimates from columns 3 and 4 in Table 5
are from the linear (Equation 4) and log-linear (Equation 5) speciﬁcations, respectively. For 1900, 1920,
and 2000 we used these speciﬁcations to predict value of life in those years, obtaining 309, 647, and 8,718
thousand dollars for these respective years using the linear speciﬁcation and 317, 612, and 6,179 for these
respective years usingthelog-linearspeciﬁcation. Percapitanationalhealthcare expendituresare fromSeries
B 221-235(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1975:73)and from U.S. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
Health Accounts. Per capita expenditures are onlyavailable beginningin 1929. The annual increase between
1920 and 1929 was interpolatedupon 1929-1940trends.
29